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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the economic integration - industrial specialization nexus and unravel the relationship
between trade and financial openness and industrial specialization. For a panel of 31 countries over the period 1970 to
2005, we find that trade integration relates negatively to specialization, while financial integration relates positively to
specialization. Furthermore, the relationship between trade (financial) integration and specialization is further deep-
ened by the level of financial (trade) integration. Lastly, trade integration has a stronger connection to industrial special-
ization in countries with a high degree of intra-industry trade, whereas financial integration has a stronger connection
to specialization in countries with a relatively underdeveloped financial system. Our findings are robust to various
measures and alternative model specifications.
Keywords: Industrial Specialization, Trade Integration, Financial Integration, Manufacturing
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1. Introduction
The past few decades have witnessed an accelerated
pace of economic integration, reflected by a very rapid
growth in cross-border commercial trade and capital
flows.1 Trade and capital flows have increased dramat-
ically during the period 1970-2005, as shown in Figure
(1a). Indeed, capital flows have shown a three-fold in-
crease since the early 1990s. At the same time, industrial
specialization - the domination of (national) economies
by a limited number of industries - has steadily increased
since 1990, as shown in Figure (1b).
The reduction or, in some cases, the complete elim-
ination of trade and financial barriers has significantly
reduced the costs of international transactions. The re-
sulting enhanced mobility of production factors has fa-
cilitated the re-location of production across sectors and
IWe are grateful to Sebnem Kalemli-Ozcan, Angelos Kanas, Clemens
Kool, Emmanuel Mamatzakis, Mark Sanders and Bent Sorensen for
helpful comments and discussions. We also thank participants at the In-
ternational Panel Data Conference 2010 in Amsterdam, the North Amer-
ican Productivity Workshop 2010 in Houston, the NAKE Research Day
2010 in Utrecht and seminar participants at Utrecht School of Economics
for useful comments. Lu Zhang gratefully acknowledges financial sup-
port from Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO). The
usual disclaimer applies.
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Email addresses: j.bos@maastrichtuniversity.nl (Jaap W.B. Bos),
economidou@unipi.gr (Claire Economidou), l.zhang1@uu.nl (Lu
Zhang)
1The term trade, hereafter, unless specified otherwise, denotes the
merchandize trade in goods.
geographical spaces. The recent increases in specializa-
tion suggest that the effect of trade and financial integra-
tion has been a reorientation of most economies towards
a more concentrated industry structure.
An interesting question that arises, is what are the link-
ages between economic integration, in particular trade
and financial integration, and industrial specialization?
Increased specialization is desirable as it enhances effi-
ciency and competitiveness and consequently has signifi-
cant welfare implications (Eckel, 2008).2 However, coun-
tries with specialized production structures are more vul-
nerable to asymmetric shocks - an issue of particular im-
portance when countries form a monetary union. Trade
and financial integration can both shape the dynamics of
industrial specialization, creating potentially more asym-
metric responses to the presence of a shock and at the
same time can reduce the adverse impact of asymmetric
shocks by diversifying the risk.3 Therefore, understand-
2According to Eckel (2008), if specialization falls and the losses from
specialization are large, compared to gains from increases in firm size
due to globalization, the per capita output can decrease and welfare can
actually decline.
3Financial integration, for example, may contribute to industrial
specialization as firms can borrow from abroad to differentiate their
production, but it also facilitates better risk sharing opportunities as
the borrowing risk is shared across different countries. A number
of studies, for example, Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Saint-Paul
(1992), and Acemoglu and Zilibotti (1997) have investigated the impact
of insurance-induced-specialization on economic growth and develop-
ment.
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Figure 1: Developments in integration and specialization
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ing the nature of the relationship between economic in-
tegration and industrial specialization is important, both
for economists and policy makers.
So far, the literature has offered a piecemeal approach
to the economic integration - industrial specialization
nexus. The roles of trade and financial integration have
typically been studied in isolation. A large strand of
the literature has explored the relationship between trade
openness and specialization. Early trade theories pre-
dict that the reduction of trade costs tends to increase
inter-industry trade, i.e., trade of goods across industries.
The main argument is that the former facilitates the way
countries exploit comparative advantages due to cross-
country differences in technology or factor endowment
(Ricardo, 1817; Ohlin, 1933), which in turn results in di-
vergence of production structures across countries. New
trade theories (Krugman, 1979, 1980; Krugman and Ven-
ables, 1990), however, stress the importance of increas-
ing returns to scale and product differentiation in facil-
itating intra-industry trade, i.e., trade of goods across
countries that belong to the same industry. As a result,
these theories predict that trade integration will induce
a shift of increasing-return industries towards countries
with good market access ("the core"), i.e. the home mar-
ket effect. Theories of new economic geography (Krug-
man, 1991; Venables, 1996) emphasize spatial agglomer-
ation forces in shaping specialization patterns and sug-
gest a non-monotonic relationship between trade liberal-
ization and location of economic activities, depending on
the level of trade costs.4
4In the presence of high trade costs, industry structures remain unal-
tered, whereas the reduction of trade costs results in the agglomeration
of economic activities into fewer locations. When trade costs drop below
a threshold, these agglomerations become smaller and more dispersed
across space.
A separate strand of literature investigates the rela-
tionship between financial integration and industrial spe-
cialization, arguing that the former can facilitate better
risk sharing opportunities among countries via cross-
holdings of portfolio assets and international borrow-
ing and lending.5 Consequently, countries are protected
against idiosyncratic risks and therefore can 'afford' to
specialize more (Brainard and Cooper, 1968; Kemp and
Liviatan, 1973; Ruffin, 1974; Helpman and Razin, 1978).6
The seminal study of Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) investi-
gates the relationship between risk sharing from financial
integration and production specialization. The authors
find a positive and robust link between risk sharing and
specialization among regions in the US, as well as across
some OECD countries. Basile and Girardi (2010) use more
advanced estimation methods, allowing for non-linearity
and spatial dependence, and confirm a similar positive
relationship across European regions. Although Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2003) acknowledge and control for the po-
tential impact of trade integration on specialization, the
effect of trade integration in conjunction with financial
integration as joint determinants of specialization is not
5Recent work by Kose et al. (2009b) examines the impact of financial
integration on the evolution of risk sharing in a large panel of countries.
The authors find support for a modest degree of risk sharing among
countries, however, far from what is predicted by theory. Artis and
Hoffmann (2007) and Sorensen et al. (2007) find improved risk sharing
among industrialized countries as financial integration increases. Other
studies find little evidence of improved risk sharing, despite massive fi-
nancial integration (Moser and Scharler, 2004; Bai and Zhang, 2006). See
Kose et al. (2009b) for an extensive literature survey.
6Obstfeld (1994) shows that financial market integration provides in-
surance through a globally diversified portfolio of investments, thereby
encouraging countries to simultaneously shift from low-return, safe
investments toward high-return, risky investments promoting higher
growth.
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explicitly examined in both studies.7
Research on the determinants of specialization typi-
cally faces a difficult choice, either to (try to) infer causal-
ity by studying a small sample for which appropriate in-
struments are available, or to study patterns for a broad
sample, thus benefiting from a large cross-sectional vari-
ation. In a recent paper, Kalemli-Ozcan and Nikolsko-
Rzhevskyy (2010) clearly opt for the former, studying
trade and financial flows between three source countries
(Germany, France, the UK) and one host country (the Ot-
toman Empire) over 1859-1913. The authors find that
trade indeed causes capital flows.
In the present paper, we opt for the latter approach,
and provide further empirical evidence on the relation-
ship between economic integration and industrial spe-
cialization. Using a detailed sample of manufacturing in-
dustries across industrialized countries, a large set of ro-
bustness analyses, various instruments and the two-step
GMM estimation technique, we shall try to approximate
a causal test to the best of our abilities. But our first and
foremost objective is to investigate the relationship be-
tween trade and financial integration and industrial spe-
cialization in a comprehensive manner for a large set of
countries and industries.
More specifically, the paper aims to answer three im-
portant questions. The first, and most basic question is
how does economic integration relate to industrial spe-
cialization? We consider two separate channels of eco-
nomic integration, that of trade integration and financial
integration, and examine their relationship with produc-
tion specialization.
The second question is to what extent financial inte-
gration acts as a moderator to the effect of trade integra-
tion on industrial specialization, and vice versa?8 For in-
stance, the effect of increases in financial integration on
industrial specialization may depend (positively or neg-
atively) on the level of trade integration, and vice versa.
To answer this question, we examine the relationship be-
tween trade (financial) integration on specialization, con-
ditional on the level of financial (trade) integration. This
could shed more light on issues such as complementarity
versus substitutability between these two channels and
threshold effects, i.e., the level of financial (trade) integra-
tion required so that trade (financial) integration has an
impact on industrial specialization; issues of importance
especially for policy makers.
The third question is to what extent intra- (or inter-) in-
dustry trade and financial development act as mediators
for the effect of trade and financial integration on indus-
trial specialization?9 Changes in trade integration may
7Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003) control for the gravity determinants of
trade.
8"[A] moderator is a qualitative (e.g., sex, race, class) or quantitative
(e.g., level of reward) variable that affects the direction and/or strength
of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a de-
pendent or criterion variable" (Baron and Kenny, 1986, p. 1174).
9"[A] given variable may be said to function as a mediator to the
have a larger effect on specialization in countries with a
low level of intra-industry trade intensity.10 Changes in
financial integration may exert a bigger impact on indus-
trial specialization in countries with a high level of finan-
cial development (Masten et al., 2008).11 To answer this
question, we therefore examine the relationship between
trade and financial integration and specialization, condi-
tional on the level of intra-industry trade intensity and fi-
nancial development.
Our work relates to various strands of literature. It re-
lates and contributes to the literature that explores the
patterns of industrial structures across countries and in-
fers whether changes of patterns reflect ongoing eco-
nomic integration (Krugman, 1991; Sapir, 1996; Brülhart,
2001; Longhi et al., 2003; Riet et al., 2004).12 In this liter-
ature, trade and financial integration are mostly latent, at
best, captured by a linear time trend (Longhi et al., 2003).
Our paper explicitly considers the channels of economic
integration and specialization and allows for interaction
between both channels.
We further relate to a number of recent studies that in-
vestigate the dynamic impact of trade integration on spe-
cialization patterns. For instance, Beine and Coulombe
extent that it accounts for the relation between the predictor and the
criterion. [...] Whereas moderator variables specify when certain effects
will hold, mediators speak to how or why such effects occur" (Baron and
Kenny, 1986, p. 1176).
10Trade-induced specialization should be less prevalent if intra-
industry trade dominates as specialization in the latter case occurs
mainly within the same industry. Krugman (1980) argues that trade al-
lows countries to specialize in a limited variety of production without
reducing the variety of goods available for consumption.
11Masten et al. (2008) argues that countries with a higher level of fi-
nancial development may benefit from improved risk sharing, as well
as a reduced cost of intermediation and higher efficiency.
12The seminal study of Krugman (1991) constructs locational Gini co-
efficients for four large US regions (Northeast, Midwest, South, West)
and four large EU countries (France, Germany, Italy, UK). It concludes
that the EU has a more dispersed production structure than the US. It
also finds that US regions are less specialized and manufacturing activ-
ities become less geographically concentrated between 1947 and 1985.
In the EU context, studies using production and employment data, al-
beit different samples and specialization measures, generally confirm
the cross-country heterogeneity in the degree of specialization, corrobo-
rating an inverse relationship between specialization and country size.
Accordingly, the EU countries tend to be more specialized within manu-
facturing sectors and big countries are more specialized at regional level
(Brülhart, 2001; Riet et al., 2004). (Small) countries experience increased
specialization over the past three decades. The increase is more pro-
nounced from the 1980s onwards(Amiti, 1999; Brülhart, 2001; Riet et al.,
2004). Longhi et al. (2003) study the regional specialization and con-
centration patterns for five Central and Eastern European (CEEC) coun-
tries over the period 1990-1999. They find that regional manufacturing
specialization as measured by the Krugman index has increased signif-
icantly in Bulgaria and Romania but has not significantly changed in
Estonia, Hungry and Slovenia. In contrast, studies using trade data
document a decreased specialization trend across EU countries over
time (Sapir, 1996; Brülhart, 1998). Brülhart (2001) reports that the de-
gree of specialization seems higher when using export data rather than
employment data. A "puzzle" is found since specialization in exports
has actually decreased even though specialization in employment has
increased. For a more extensive analysis of EU manufacturing, see
Midelfart-Knarvik et al. (2000) and European Commission (2007).
3
(2007) study the impact of trade liberalization between
Canada and the US, measured by the decrease of trade-
weighted tariffs, on the degree of industrial specializa-
tion for Canadian regions. They disentangle the short-
run from the long-run impact, motivated by the distinc-
tion between short-run adjustment costs and long-run ef-
ficiency gains associated with trade liberalization. Their
results favor a positive short-run relationship and a nega-
tive long-run relationship between trade integration and
industrial specialization, i.e., short-run specialization and
long-run diversification. Crabbé et al. (2007) perform a
similar analysis for thirteen CEEC countries and show
that trade integration leads to long-run specialization.13
An important element missing in all aforementioned pa-
pers is financial openness, which we explicitly take into
account.
Lastly, we also relate to a handful of studies that have
attempted to unify different strands of literature to ana-
lyze the effect of trade and financial openness on special-
ization. For example, the study of Imbs (2004) examines
the complex relationships between trade, finance, special-
ization, and business cycle synchronization in the context
of a system of simultaneous equations based on a cross-
sectional country-pair setting in 24 countries.14 Our pa-
per builds on these earlier contributions, mainly on that
of Imbs (2004) and Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003, 2004). It de-
parts, however, from that literature in a number of ways.
It treats trade and financial integration as multilateral
rather than bilateral phenomena (Imbs, 2006) and chooses
country-year instead of country-pair as the unit of our
analysis. In contrast to past attempts (Kalemli-Ozcan
et al., 2003), this paper discusses channels and condi-
tional effects of trade (finance) on specialization. Finally,
the panel-based estimation techniques used here exploit
both time-series as well as cross-section variations and
are well-suited to solve endogeneity issues, thus yielding
more efficient estimates.
Our empirical analysis is based on a sample that con-
sists of manufacturing industries, twice as disaggregated
as those used in past related studies (Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
2003), and a time span that is more extensive than that of
previous studies (Imbs, 2004; Basile and Girardi, 2010).
Our sample consists of 20 manufacturing industries in 31
countries over the period 1970-2005.
Our results reveal that trade and financial integration
jointly relate to industrial specialization. Trade integra-
13Crabbé et al. (2007) interpret the different results as evidence of a
possible non-monotonic relationship between trade integration and in-
dustrial specialization along the development path. A closely related
study in this respect is that of Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), who demon-
strate a U-shaped pattern between the specialization of a country and
the level of its per capita income. Countries initially diversify to reduce
the risk of sector-specific shocks, while in the later stage of development,
countries start to specialize when their per capita income has grown to
a critical level.
14Similar investigations are performed by Frankel and Rose (1998),
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2004), Imbs (2006), Calderón et al. (2007), Inklaar
et al. (2008).
tion has a negative relationship with specialization (Beine
and Coulombe, 2007), whereas financial integration has a
positive one (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003; Basile and Gi-
rardi, 2010; Imbs, 2004). We also demonstrate that both
types of integration act as moderators to each other. The
relationship of trade (financial) integration with special-
ization is more pronounced when the level of financial
(trade) integration is high, pointing to a complementary
relationship between them. Moreover, the negative re-
lationship between trade integration and specialization is
only relevant in countries with very low levels of financial
integration, whereas the positive relationship between fi-
nancial integration and specialization is only meaningful
when countries are sufficiently open to trade. These find-
ings extend and complement those of Imbs (2004). Fur-
thermore, for the Eurozone countries, regional trade in-
tegration coincides with increased diversification, while
global trade integration corresponds to more specializa-
tion. Lastly, intra-industry trade acts as a mediator to
lower the effectiveness of the trade integration channel
as an increase in trade integration has a less negative re-
lationship with specialization in cases where intra-trade
intensity is high. Financial development acts as a media-
tor for the effect of financial integration on specialization
as higher levels of financial development make the finan-
cial integration channel less effective, in support of the
substitution among them in driving specialization. The
results are robust to alternative model specifications and
the use of a range of different measures of specialization,
trade and financial openness.
Our findings highlight that policies for (further) trade
and financial integration should be jointly designed for
countries to fully seize the benefits of specialized pro-
duction structures, economies of scale and increased ef-
ficiency. However, countries with specialized production
structures are more vulnerable to asymmetric shocks. The
latter, is of particular interest for the Eurozone, where
well-functioning risk-sharing mechanisms can secure the
benefits of specialization.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Sec-
tion 2 exposes the model(s) under estimation and the
econometric strategy. Section 3 presents the data and the
measures proposed. Section 4 discusses the results. Fi-
nally, Section 5 summarizes and concludes.
2. Methodology
This section presents the empirical specifications and
theoretical considerations according to the questions
raised in the previous section and discusses the estima-
tion strategies followed.
2.1. Model Specification and Theoretical Considerations
A general investigation of the relationship of economic
integration and specialization starts with the following
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specification:15
Sit = µi + β1Tit + β2Fit + β′Zit + εit, (1)
where i denotes the country and t time; S is a specializa-
tion index; µi is country-specific fixed effect; Tit and Fit
capture the degree of trade and financial integration, re-
spectively; β′ is a 1 × n parameter vector; Z is an n × 1
vector of control variables; and, finally, εit is the error
term. All variables are in logs.16
Most classical trade theories, with reference to the the-
ory of comparative advantage, predict that trade integra-
tion leads to more (industrial) specialization and accord-
ingly one should expect a positive β1. Falling trade costs
result in a narrowing non-traded sector and therefore it is
cheaper to import goods rather than produce them do-
mestically Dornbusch et al. (1977). Thus resources are
freed up and used more intensely in fewer activities.
Financial integration may induce specialization
through risk-sharing. Open and well integrated financial
markets offer a broader range of financial instruments
and permit the diversification of ownership via two types
of insurance. First, if residents in one country hold debt
and equity claims on the output of the other country,
then the dividend, interest, and rental income derived
from these holdings contribute to smoothing of shocks
across countries. It is thus a form of ex ante international
insurance. Second, to achieve consumption smoothing,
households in each country can ex post adjust their asset
portfolios, following the occurrence of shocks in the
region. Again, this will lead to income smoothing in
all countries. Once insurance is available through trade
in financial assets, each country will have a stronger
incentive to specialize in fewer forms of production (or
technology) in order to fully exploit economies of scale
or technological competitive advantages. Therefore, β2
is expected to carry a positive sign (Kalemli-Ozcan et al.,
2003; Basile and Girardi, 2010).
The vector Z contains a number of control variables
that have been commonly used in the relevant literature.
These variables capture the size of the manufacturing sec-
tor and the stage of the economic development. More
specifically, the size of the manufacturing sector (Size) is
measured as the manufacturing value added divided by
the total value added of all sectors. A large manufactur-
ing sector may foster a broader range of industrial pro-
ductions and thus has a more balanced industrial struc-
ture, whereas the opposite could be the case with a small
manufacturing sector. Consequently, the coefficient of the
15See, for example, Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2003), Basile and Girardi
(2010).
16There is no theoretical guidance on whether to use levels or logs of
variables in our specifications. Ultimately, we choose logs as they yield
a better fit and make the results easier to interpret as elasticities. See,
for example, Baltagi et al. (2009) for a similar treatment regarding the
functional form.
size of the manufacturing sector is expected to bear a pos-
itive sign, as countries with a relatively small manufactur-
ing sector are more likely to specialize. The stage of eco-
nomic development is measured as the GDP per capita
(GDPpc), and GDP per capita squared (GDPpc2) to allow
for possible nonlinear effects between economic develop-
ment and specialization. For instance, Imbs and Wacziarg
(2003) argue that specialization is likely to change along
the development path of a country. They provide robust
evidence that countries experience two stages of diver-
sification. At low levels of per capita income, countries
reduce their overall specialization to mitigate the adverse
effect of sector-specific shocks, while when per capita in-
come reaches a high level, countries specialize again to
fully exploit the comparative advantage.17
The specification above has been employed in the liter-
ature and will also be used in our paper to answer our
first question, which concerns the impact of trade and
financial integration on specialization of production. A
drawback with this specification is that it treats trade and
financial integration as independent channels and does
not allow for any interaction between them. Recent evi-
dence (e.g. Kose et al., 2006, 2009a) has demonstrated that
trade and financial integration are closely related phe-
nomena as they tend to move closely together and coun-
tries often cannot opt for trade (financial) integration in-
dependently of their degree of financial (trade) integra-
tion.
Therefore, to address our second question, which is to
what extent financial (trade) integration acts as a moder-
ator to the effect of trade (financial) integration on spe-
cialization, we include an interaction term (T × F) in the
equation (2a):
Sit = µi + β1Tit + β2Fit + β3Tit × Fit + β′Zit + εit. (2a)
In the equation above, we allow the relationship of one
type of integration with specialization to be moderated by
the other type of integration. The marginal effect of trade
(financial) integration then becomes the partial derivative
of specialization with respect to trade (financial) integra-
tion in equations (2b) and (2c), respectively:
∂Sit
∂Tit
= β1 + β3Fit, (2b)
∂Sit
∂Fit
= β2 + β3Tit. (2c)
According to classical theories of trade, trade openness
works as a substitute for capital flows as trade integra-
tion reduces the incentives for capital to flow to capital-
scarce countries. However, recent theoretical and empiri-
cal evidence offers and confirms a number of reasons that
17From a theoretical point of view, Imbs and Wacziarg (2003) argue
that this pattern is consistent with models featuring endogenous stages
of specialization to both trade and economic growth.
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support the complementarity between trade and financial
integration. On the one hand, trade integration may fos-
ter financial integration, either by creating demands for
symmetric financial flows, or by promoting foreign direct
investment (FDI) in export-oriented sectors. The rapid
growth of FDI and the establishment of multinational
firms further drive the demand for financing, as those
firms increasingly turn to foreign banks and the stock
exchange to raise their necessary funds, thus leading to
growing financial flows.18 On the other hand, financial
integration may promote specialization via risk sharing
or facilitate the reallocation of capital to sectors that have
a comparative advantage, therefore increasing the oppor-
tunities for trade (Feeney, 1994a,b). Antràs and Caballero
(2009) model trade and capital flows as complements, es-
pecially in less financially developed economies, as trade
integration increases the return to capital and capital in-
flows to these countries. This complementary relation-
ship has also been confirmed empirically by a number of
studies.19 In line with this literature, we expect the im-
pact of trade (financial) integration on specialization to
increase with the degree of financial (trade) integration,
i.e., a positive β3 in equations (2b) and (2c).
It is widely agreed that the EU is the most developed
form of regional integration across national borders that
currently exists (Laffan, 1998; Murray, 2004). Like global
trade and financial integration, regional integration may
also have an enormous impact on industrial structures
across this group of countries. Eurozone countries trade
heavily with each other. Approximately 50 percent of
trade flows of these countries take place within the Euro-
zone and over time there is a tremendous increase in their
trade among each other as, on average, intra-Eurozone
trade as a percentage of each member country’s GDP has
steadily increased from 20 percent in 1970 to 40 percent in
2005.20
We investigate the relationship between regional trade
18For example, a number of studies show that multinational or foreign
firms have easier access to international source of external financing and
face lower financing obstacles (Schiantarelli and Sembenelli, 2000; Har-
rison and McMillan, 2003; Beck et al., 2006).
19For example, Aizenman and Noy (2009) postulate a two-way feed-
back between trade and financial integration, i.e. de facto trade (finan-
cial) openness is associated with larger future financial (trade) open-
ness, asserting that trade and financial integration are complements
rather than substitutes. Chambet and Gibson (2008) decompose coun-
tries’ trade openness measure into its natural and residual components
and find that both measures contribute positively to stock market in-
tegration for a large panel of emerging economies. Chow et al. (2005)
confirm the interdependence of trade and financial integration in East
Asian countries. Kalemli-Ozcan and Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy (2010) con-
firm that trade causes capital flows, using historical evidence from trade
and financial flows between three source countries (Germany, France,
the UK) and one host country (the Ottoman Empire) over 1859-1913,
whereas García-Herrero and Ruiz (2008) argue that trade linkages do
not seem to be significantly affected by financial linkages, nor promot-
ing financial linkages in the country of their investigation, Spain.
20Authors’ own calculation based on the data from the United Na-
tions Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) Handbook of
Statistics, 2008.
integration on specialization by means of equation (2a′),
where in place of global trade integration T in (2a), we
place an index of regional trade integration, INT, which
is the amount of trade a eurozone country trades with
the rest of the Eurozone members scaled by the country’s
GDP:21
Sit = µi + β1 INTit + β2Fit + β3 INTit × Fit + β′Zit + εit,
(2a′)
The sign of the estimated coefficients is expected to be
the same as those in equation (2a) since the same rea-
soning applies here as well, while the coefficients are ex-
pected to be of greater magnitude as the Eurozone coun-
tries’ proximity and institutional homogeneity are ex-
pected to strengthen the economic integration - industrial
specialization nexus.
With our third and final question, we aim to examine
to what extent intra-(inter-) industry trade intensity (I IT)
and financial development (FD) act as mediators to fa-
cilitate trade and financial integration. To this end, we
estimate equations (3a) and (3b) below:
Sit = µi + β1Tit + β2Fit + β3Tit× I ITit + β4 I ITit + β′Zit + εit,
(3a)
Sit = µi + β1Tit + β2Fit + β3Fit× FDit + β4FDit + β′Zit + εit.
(3b)
In equation (3a), we depart from our baseline specifica-
tion (1) by controlling for the type of trade. The inclusion
of an I IT index allows for a more explicit test on the im-
pact of the nature of trade, i.e., intra- vs. inter-trade, on in-
dustrial specialization. The index ranges from 0, indicat-
ing pure inter-industry trade, to 1, indicating pure intra-
industry trade. Classical trade theories postulate that fur-
ther trade integration is likely to result in more specializa-
tion if trade is predominantly the inter-industry type. On
the contrary, if trade is of the intra-industry type, trade-
induced specialization may be weaker as trade leads
countries to concentrate on the production of a limited
number of products within the industry. Therefore, spe-
cialization in this case occurs mainly within the industry
rather than across industries (Krugman, 1981). Accord-
ingly, β3 is expected to carry a negative sign, suggesting
that trade integration leads to a lesser degree of special-
ization if the intra-industry trade intensity is high.
Next, equation (3b) explores the role of financial devel-
opment as a moderator to the relationship between finan-
cial integration and specialization. We again deviate from
equation (1), this time by introducing an interaction term
between financial integration and financial development
(FD), together with a separate (FD) term to control for
21Due to data limitations, it is notoriously difficult to find a good mea-
sure to quantify regional financial integration for these countries. Al-
though the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) International Direct Investment Statistics Database for 2008 pro-
vides cross-country flows of inward and outward FDI, these data are
only available after 1985 and the coverage is rather poor. Therefore we
mainly focus on regional trade integration.
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the direct impact of financial development on specializa-
tion. Financial development, as a source of comparative
advantage, can directly influence the degree of specializa-
tion by promoting finance-dependent sectors (Beck, 2002,
2003; Svaleryd and Vlachos, 2005; Hur et al., 2006). A vast
body of existing literature has strongly emphasized that
benefits associated with financial integration only become
significant at higher level of financial development.22 The
interaction between financial development and financial
integration is complex and depends on the mechanism
at work. On the one hand, financial development fa-
cilitates financial integration as domestic financial inter-
mediaries, which distribute international assets, offer a
local channel by which investors can gain foreign expo-
sure. The latter may also increase the desire for interna-
tional diversification. Furthermore, a well-developed fi-
nancial system, in particular the strength or effectiveness
of domestic financial regulation, is attractive to foreign
investors: foreign investors will stay away from markets
that do not protect their interests. Thus, financial inte-
gration and financial development may be complements
in shaping specialization. On the other hand, financial
development may represent an alternative channel in di-
versifying sector-specific risks within countries (King and
Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2000). As a conse-
quence, countries are less prone to idiosyncratic produc-
tion risks, which leaves less scope for cross-country risk
sharing via financial integration. In this case, financial in-
tegration and financial development may be a substitute
in driving specialization. Therefore, the sign of β3 is a pri-
ori ambiguous.
2.2. Estimation Procedure
We use the two-step GMM estimator to extract consis-
tent and efficient estimates of the various model specifi-
cations discussed above. Compared to past related stud-
ies, which rely mainly on cross-section analysis, we make
efficient use of the data as we exploit both time-series
and cross-section dimensions without wasting valuable
information. With the two-step GMM estimation pro-
cedure, we can control for country-specific heterogene-
ity, non-stationarity of variables and possible endogene-
ity (reverse causality) of the regressors.23 As a result, we
are able to examine causal effects that other related stud-
ies ignore. In particular, the reverse causality that runs
from specialization to trade could pose serious challenges
22See, for example, the studies of Masten et al. (2008) and Klein and
Olivei (2008).
23More specifically, the two-step GMM estimator utilizes an optimal
weighting matrix that minimizes the asymptotic variance of the esti-
mator. It takes the first differences of the variables to remove unob-
served country-specific effects and any endogeneity bias arising from
the correlation of these fixed-effects with explanatory variables. First-
differencing also ensures the stationarity of variables. Since the time
dimension of our panel is relatively long, we need to adequately con-
sider the non-stationary nature of regression variables in order to avoid
running a spurious regression.
to the validity and inferences of the estimates. We allevi-
ate this concern by using lagged levels to instrument the
endogenous variable in the first-difference equation.
To check the consistency of our estimates, a range of di-
agnostic tests are employed. First, we perform a Durbin-
Wu-Hausman (DHW) endogeneity test in order to exam-
ine whether trade is indeed endogenous in our specifica-
tions.24 Then, we ensure the validity of the instruments
used to overcome reverse causality issues. The key ex-
ogeneity assumption in our context is that a country’s
historical levels of trade are orthogonal to current shocks
on specialization, i.e., lagged variables must be uncorre-
lated with the error term in the level equations. We do
so by applying the Arellano-Bond serial correlation test.25
The usage of multiple instruments allows us to perform
a Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions.26 Then,
the Kleibergen-Paap rk test is used to examine whether
the endogenous regressor is well-identified by the instru-
ments.27 Lastly, we employ the Anderson-Rubin test of
weak-identification-robust test.28 The last two tests en-
sure the relevance and strength of our instruments.29
3. Data
In answering the three questions posed in this paper,
we face a number of data considerations. First, having
a sufficiently disaggregated set of industries is important
to avoid aggregation issues when measuring specializa-
tion. Put bluntly, at a higher level of aggregation, coun-
tries’ industrial structures will appear alike by construc-
tion. A second consideration for the purpose of our anal-
ysis, is the fact that we require a relatively broad set of
countries to ensure sufficient variation in specialization
patterns. Thirdly, trade and financial openness are com-
plex processes that require time to develop.30 In addition,
24The test posits the null hypothesis that the introduction of instru-
ments has no effect on the estimates of the regression’s coefficients.
25If there is no serial correlation (in the level equation), one should re-
ject the null hypothesis of absence of serial correlation in the first differ-
ences. In this case, any historical values of trade, beyond period t− 2 are
potentially valid instruments. In contrast, if serial correlation is present,
one needs to take deeper lags from period t− 3 as instruments. In prin-
ciple, the number of lags available as instruments increase with the time
dimension T. To alleviate the potential problems arising from a dis-
proportional large number of instruments, we limit the number of lags
to three. Our choice is also motivated by a practical reason that some
countries are covered in our sample for a relatively short period of time.
We limit the number of lags in order not to lose a significant amount of
observations.
26The Hansen test yields a J-statistic which is distributed as χ2 under
the null hypothesis that all instruments are valid.
27The null hypothesis is that the equation is under-identified, i.e. the
excluded instruments are not correlated with the endogenous regressor.
28The rejection of the null hypothesis indicates that the endogenous
regressors are relevant.
29For a comprehensive discussion of our methodology, see Baum et al.
(2003).
30This holds even more for studies that use de jure (by law) measures
of trade and finance, where one needs a considerable time span to see
these policies to be realized.
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a short time span, not covering several cycles, may turn
out not to be very representative. Since reverse causality
may be an issue, a longer time span allows for a deeper
lag structure and more appropriate instruments.
In measuring trade and financial integration, we face
the choice between de facto measures of trade and finan-
cial integration, which quantify a country’s actual degree
of openness through realized trade and financial flows, or
de jure measures, which indicate the extent of government
restrictions on trade and capital flows. Arguably, de facto
measures are more suitable for our analysis than de jure
measures. First, de facto measures capture the actual ef-
fects of liberalization policies. A country with very liberal
(i.e., no) capital restrictions does not necessarily engage
heavily in international transactions. Likewise, a country
with tight capital controls may find them ineffective in
the presence of a capital flight (Kose et al., 2006, 2009a).31
Second, de facto measures provide variations across coun-
tries and over time and hence are suitable for panel-based
analysis. Third, although de jure measures may be pre-
ferred because they are theoretically grounded and reflect
the decision to 'open up' more closely than the de facto
measures, this weakness of the latter is also their strength
as they are less susceptible to endogeneity. De facto open-
ness measures carry some exogenous elements, owing
to historical, geographical or political reasons, which are
less affected by government policies.32. The analysis in
this paper will therefore focus largely on de facto measures
of trade and financial integration.33
Our empirical analysis covers an unbalanced panel of
31The distinction between de jure and de facto integration measures
is of particular relevance in understanding the differences between the
terms liberalization, openness and integration. Broadly speaking, (de
jure) liberalization is a necessary condition for (de facto) openness, but
not a sufficient condition. Countries maintaining very liberalized cur-
rent and capital accounts may not necessarily attract sufficient trade
and capital flow (for example, the African countries). Similarly, finan-
cial openness is a necessary but not sufficient condition for integration.
Integration requires openness as the first step, consequently ensures do-
mestic financial markets effectively become part of the world market,
synchronizing interest rate movements, saving and investment activi-
ties, and the accumulation of physical capital stocks. In this sense, fi-
nancial openness is the means, while financial integration is the goal. In
this paper, as we measure trade and financial integration by means of
de facto openness, we use the terms "integration" and "openness" inter-
changeably.
32For example, countries with a more specialized production struc-
ture are more prone to open up to trade and/or capital flows to promote
specialized sectors. See a similar line of argument in Baltagi et al. (2009)
33One of the most comprehensive de jure measures of trade integra-
tion is constructed by Wacziarg and Welch (2003), extending the work of
Sachs and Warner (1995). It takes a value of one when a country’s trade
regime is liberalized, and zero otherwise. Wacziarg and Welch (2003)
argue that the date of trade liberalization captures major changes in
trade policy, thus it is more reliable than current account restrictiveness
measures published in the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Arrange-
ment and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Based on the Wacziarg and
Welch (2003) measure, all countries in our sample are considered as "lib-
eralized" over the whole period. When it comes to financial integra-
tion, Chinn and Ito (2006) compile a composite index of capital account
liberalization based on four AREAER’s binary dummies that codify re-
strictions on cross-border financial transactions. Although this de jure
20 two-digit manufacturing industries in 31 countries
during the period 1970-2005, the longest period for which
data are available for the largest amount of countries.34
We focus on manufacturing industries on the premise that
these industries, in contrast to services, are involved in
trade, and are therefore more responsive to trade inte-
gration. We ensure that the number of sectors available
through time is constant across countries, while coverage
across time varies per country. This way, both within-
country and cross-country changes in specialization can
be compared and interpreted in a consistent manner. Ta-
ble A.1 in the Appendix lists the 31 countries and the
corresponding time span. Table A.2 in the Appendix re-
ports the 20 industries and their NACE codes considered
in our analysis. Annual raw data are retrieved from var-
ious sources. Below, we explain how the variables are
constructed and the sources of our data.
Industrial Specialization
Our primary index of specialization (S) is the Gini co-
efficient, which measures the degree of concentration or
inequality of the distribution of sector shares in an econ-
omy(Gini, 1921) and is defined as follows:35
S =
2
n2s
n
∑
j=1
j(sj − s) (4)
where j denotes the sector, n denotes the number of sec-
tors, s represents the share of each sector, and s refers to
the average sector share. The index ranges from zero,
where all sectors have an equal share of total manufac-
turing value added implying a perfectly diversified econ-
omy, to one hundred, where only one sector produces all
manufacturing value added, reflecting a strongly special-
ized economy.
To check the robustness of our results, we also use two
other indices of industrial specialization. These indices
are the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HRI), which sums
up the square of each sector’s share in the total manu-
facturing value added of a country, and the coefficient
of variation of sector shares (VSI), which is defined as
the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean of sector
shares in one country. Since all three indices are highly
correlated, we rely primarily on the Gini coefficient as
our baseline index, and do not report the results using the
measure offers some (but limited) variations over time, it is constructed
using a principle component analysis and thus produces results that are
difficult to interpret. Therefore, we only use this measure as robustness
check.
34Even though there is a November 2009 update to the EU-KLEMS
database, running to 2007, the new data include only a limited number
of variables and industries. For reasons explained above, our analysis
ends in 2005, and we rely on the two-digit disaggregation throughout.
35The Gini coefficient is commonly used in the empirical literature
to measure industrial specialization (Krugman, 1991; Amiti, 1999; Imbs,
2004).
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other indices, but describe them in the robustness analy-
sis.36 Table A.1 in the Appendix shows the average Gini
coefficient over time for each country in our sample. We
find that Latvia, Ireland and Cyprus are the most spe-
cialized countries, whereas Austria, Slovenia and United
Kingdoms are the least specialized ones.
For our industrial specialization index, we use
industry-specific data from the EU KLEMS database and
the 60-Industry database.37 We extract annual raw data on
sectoral value added at the market price, divided by the
sectoral value added deflator to obtain real value added
per sector in each country. We also extract employment
(total number of hours worked) data from EU KLEMS
to compute the same specialization indices (GINIEMP,
HRIEMP, VSIEMP). Since output-based (e.g., value
added) measures provide a more general representation
of industries and thus are more suitable and appropriate
than those based on labor inputs (e.g., employment), we
use employment-based specialization measures as a ro-
bustness check.38
Trade Integration, Financial Integration and Financial Devel-
opment
Our primary measure for trade integration is the ratio
of imports plus exports divided by GDP (T). This contin-
uous measure is widely used in the empirical literature.
For robustness purposes, we also use the share of imports
to GDP (IMP) and the share of exports to GDP (EXP), as
well as manufacturing trade as a share of total manufac-
turing output (MANT), a much a narrower measure of
trade openness.39 As an additional check for the validity
of using lagged levels of trade openness as instruments,
for each country, we construct the average of its neighbor-
ing countries’ trade openness (AT) as an alternative in-
strument. This instrument allows us to exploit the (time-
varying) exogeneity of this variable to identify the effects
of trade integration on specialization, following Baltagi
et al. (2009). Country-level data of trade volume, imports,
exports, manufacturing trade and GDP have been taken
from the World Bank (2008) World Development Indicators
36Pairwise and Spearman rank correlations are at least 0.947, and al-
ways significant at the 1 percent level.
37We extract data for 29 countries from the EU KLEMS database,
while data for Canada and Norway are derived from the 60-Industry
database, which was succeeded by the EU KLEMS database. Both
databases are maintained by Groningen Growth and Development Cen-
ter (GGDC).
38As an additional check, we also compute specialization measures
using sectoral export data from the OECD (2006) Structural Analysis
database (STAN). The results are broadly consistent with those presented
later using production data. Since we primarily focus on production
specialization in this paper, results based on export data are available
upon request.
39For Norway, we use total manufacturing trade divided by value
added instead of output as output data are not available in the 60-
Industry Database and Norway is no longer included in the subsequent
EU KLEMS database.
(WDI). Data on total manufacturing output have been ob-
tained from the EU KLEMS database.
The intra-industry trade intensity (I IT) indicator is the
Grubel-Lloyd index (Grubel and Lloyd, 1975), calculated
as follows:
I IT = 1− ∑j | EXPOj − IMPOj |
∑j(EXPOj + IMPOj)
, (5)
where i denotes country and j represents sector. It ranges
from 0, indicating pure inter-industry trade, to 1, indicat-
ing pure intra-industry trade. This measure allows for
a more explicit test on the impact of trade integration,
controlling for the nature of trade. We take an aggregate
country-level I IT indicator (for OECD countries in our
sample) from the OECD (2006) Structural Analysis database
(STAN), which is computed using detailed trade data of
two- and three-digit manufacturing sectors.
Lastly, to assess the impact of trade openness on spe-
cialization among highly integrated countries, we con-
struct another measure of trade intensity for each Eu-
rozone country, that of the intra-Eurozone trade (INT),
which is computed as the fraction of trade of a Eurozone
member with the rest of the group scaled by the country’s
GDP. Data on the intra-Eurozone trade have been taken
from the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, 2008.
We follow the same approach with financial integra-
tion, where our primary measure F is the ratio of total
foreign assets and total foreign liabilities as a percent-
age of GDP. This stock-based measure is constructed, fol-
lowing Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007), by aggregating
data on assets and liabilities on FDI, equity portfolio,
debt, financial derivatives and official reserves adjusted
for valuation issues.40 As a robustness check, we con-
sider three other measures. The first measure counts only
the amount of total liabilities divided by GDP (LIB) as a
country is more financially integrated if it is able to at-
tract foreign capital flows. The second one is the assets
and liabilities on FDI and portfolio investments as a per-
centage of GDP (FDIEQU). The debt component of our
primary financial integration measure includes, however,
sovereign debt and other debt with official creditors like
the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and may prove
misleading regarding a country’s degree of financial in-
tegration. For example, countries imposing restrictions
on capital flows to private agents may hold a large pro-
portion of foreign debt and therefore could be consid-
ered as 'integrated' with the global financial market. This
narrower measure aims to circumvent the problem asso-
ciated with the debt component. All three stock-based
measures are retrieved from the Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
40Unlike a flow-based measure, like gross capital inflow plus outflows
divided by GDP, this stock-based measure takes into account the history
of a country’s financial integration and its changes over time. It is typ-
ically less prone to short-run changes in the political and economic cli-
mate, and is thus a preferred measure for our purpose. See Edison et al.
(2002) for the discussion of flow-based vs. stock-based measures.
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Source Mean Min Max Std Obs
M
ain
V
ariables
S Gini Coefficient of Specialization (0 to 100) KLEMS 44.239 26.891 77.039 8.343 808
T Trade openness, % of GDP WDI 73.776 11.254 203.539 39.826 930
INT Trade with Eurozone, % of GDP UNCTAD 27.741 18.518 107.54 6.597 396
F Financial openness,% of GDP LMF07 164.288 9.811 1854.411 177.094 882
IIT Intra-industry trade intensity (0 to 1) STAN 0.673 0.172 0.993 0.155 833
FD Liquid liability, % of GDP Beck et al. (1999) 69.051 30.106 242.215 32.987 776
Size Size of manufacturing sector, KLEMS 21.897 8.276 67.621 6.348 808
% of total value added
GDPpc Per capita real GDP (2000 $K) WDI 14.794 1.853 40.618 8.526 951
V
ariables
in
R
obustness
A
nalysis
HRI Herfindahl-Hirschman index KLEMS 0.096 0.061 0.404 0.044 808
VSI Coefficient of variation KLEMS 0.924 0.489 2.729 0.328 808
GINIEMP Gini coefficient, employment KLEMS 41.567 6.867 0.620 0.069 811
HRIEMP Herfindahl-Hirschman index, employment KLEMS 0.086 0.062 61.958 6.867 811
VSIEMP Coefficient of variation, employment KLEMS 0.840 0.500 1.538 0.213 811
IMP Imports, % of GDP WDI 37.468 5.444 112.766 20.418 930
EXP Exports, % of GDP WDI 36.308 5.658 100.031 19.838 930
MANT Manufacturing trade, WDI, KLEMS 64.296 38.429 204.558 8.779 815
% of manufacturing output
AT Average trade openness WDI 67.420 11.254 229.334 30.537 1013
of neighboring countries, % of GDP
LIB Liabilities,% of GDP LMF07 10.357 0.023 208.541 20.710 814
FDIEQU Assets and liabilities of FDI LMF07 88.459 3.697 936.932 88.145 882
and portfolio investment, % of GDP
Fjure De jure financial openness index CHIN08 0.977 -1.808 2.541 1.485 881
PRI Private Credits, % of GDP Beck et al. (1999) 0.715 0.017 3.451 0.412 911
HHI Bank concentration index (0 to 1) Beck et al. (1999) 0.680 0.201 0.992 0.194 471
SizeEMP Size of manufacturing sector KLEMS 23.735 10.774 40.876 6.144 811
% of manufacturing employment
Luxembourg is excluded. KLEMS refers to the EU KLEMS database. UNCTAD refers to the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
Handbook of Statistics, 2008. WDI refers to the World Development Indicator database. LMF07 refers to Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007). CHIN08 refers to
Chinn and Ito (2008).
(2007) database. Lastly, a de jure measure of capital ac-
count liberalization (Fjure) is obtained from Chinn and
Ito (2008).
Furthermore, to examine how financial development
mediates the effect of financial integration on specializa-
tion, we take liquid liabilities (currency plus demand and
interesting-bearing liabilities), scaled to GDP as a proxy
for financial development (FD). This measure includes
liabilities from three types of financial institutions: the
central bank, deposit money banks and other financial in-
termediaries. It is the broadest available indicator of fi-
nancial development, commonly described as "financial
depth" in the literature (Levine, 1997). For robustness
purpose, we also choose an alternative measure that de-
scribes the size of financial intermediation: the value of
credits provided by deposit money banks and other fi-
nancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by
GDP (PRI). This measure isolates credits issued to the
private sector as opposed to credits issued to govern-
ments, government agencies, and public enterprises and
excludes credits issued by the central bank. Another
measure for financial development is the Herfindahl-
Hirschman bank concentration index (HHI). In contrast
to size-based measures, this bank concentration index
captures the structure of the banking sector, which is of
importance in influencing the industrial structure and in
facilitating risk sharing through international borrowing
and lending.41 The use of both measures allows us to
explore which aspect of financial development, financial
depth or the structure of banking sector, is important. All
measures of financial development are obtained from the
Beck et al. (1999) database.
Other Variables
The vector Z includes the size of the manufactur-
ing industry (Size), calculated as manufacturing value
added divided by the total value added of all sectors,
as well as GDP per capita (GDPpc) and its squared term
(GDPpc2) to characterize the stage of economic develop-
ment. For robustness purposes, we also calculate the size
41For example, Cetorelli and Gambera (2001) find that bank concen-
tration promotes growth of those industrial sectors that are more in need
of external finance by improving credit access for younger firms. They
also argue that a concentrated banking system may impose a growth
penalty across all sectors and firms.Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) demon-
strate that potential entry firms face greater difficulty in obtaining bank
credit in a concentrated banking market.
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of the manufacturing industry (SizeEMP) as manufactur-
ing employment divided by the total employment of all
sectors. The value added and employment data come
from KLEMS, while GDP per capita (constant 2000 US
dollars) is taken from the World Bank (2008) World Devel-
opment Indicators (WDI). Table 1 summarizes the defini-
tions, sources and descriptive statistics of main variables
as well as those used in robustness analysis, respectively.
Having presented the model specifications and mea-
sures of trade and financial integration and specialization,
as well as the related control variables, we can now em-
bark on the estimation of our specifications, in order to
find answers to the set of questions raised in this paper.
The presentation and discussion of the empirical findings
is the task of the next section.
4. Empirical Results
This section presents the empirical results. We exam-
ine, first, how trade and financial integration relate to in-
dustrial specialization individually and, second, jointly.
Third, we explore the role of intra-industry trade and
financial development in facilitating the relationship of
trade and financial integration and specialization, respec-
tively. Table 2, accompanied by a set of diagnostic tests, is
organized accordingly and summarizes our findings. Ta-
ble A.3 in the Appendix presents all robustness checks.
4.1. Do trade and financial integration affect industrial spe-
cialization?
We start by investigating the independent impact of
trade and financial integration on industrial specializa-
tion. Column (I) in Table 2 reports the two-step GMM
results of the baseline model defined by equation (1).
As the results show, we find a statistically significant
(at 1 percent) negative relationship between trade inte-
gration and specialization, indicating that further open-
ness to foreign trade coincides with a more diversified in-
dustrial structure - a finding in contradiction to the pre-
diction of classical trade theories based on comparative
advantage. One the one hand, this contradiction may
be driven by forces not captured in these theories, in-
cluding the presence of trade costs, factor price inequal-
ity, and difference in technology and productivity across
countries(Bernard et al., 2007).Our finding corroborates
with López and Sánchez (2005), who find a negative re-
lationship between openness and specialization for ten
European countries. They assert that the convergence
of industrial structures following the openness to foreign
trade is consistent with the prediction of the Hechscher-
Ohlin-Vanek theory: when factor prices are equalizing,
the sources of comparative advantage arising from rela-
tive differences in factor prices disappear. On the other
hand, trade integration implies the creation of new ex-
porting industries, which in turn leads to the expansion
of aggregate production in those industries. This pro-
cess could be driven by agglomeration forces and forward
(larger market)-backward (large input variety) linkages
pointed out by new economic geography theories (Fu-
jita et al., 2001). This result is also in line with Beine and
Coulombe (2007), who find a long-run positive impact of
trade integration on export diversification of Canadian re-
gions, but in contrast with Crabbé et al. (2007), who em-
ploy the same estimation strategy and show the opposite
for thirteen CEEC countries.
Turning to the role of financial integration, we observe
a statistically significant (at 1 percent) positive effect of fi-
nancial integration on specialization, in line with the risk-
sharing rationale put forward by Kalemli-Ozcan et al.
(2003). By allowing access to foreign markets, financial
integration can bring a wider range of financing sources
and investment opportunities, permitting the decoupling
of production and consumption via cross-country risk
sharing mechanisms and making it less costly for coun-
tries to achieve greater specialization.
In terms of magnitude, the negative impact of trade
openness dominates the positive effect of financial open-
ness in driving specialization. Ceteris paribus, a one
standard-deviation increase in (the log of) trade openness
results in a decrease in the log Gini index equivalent to
2.4 standard deviations, whereas a standard-deviation in-
crease in (the log of) financial openness is associated with
a increase in log Gini coefficient of roughly 0.65 standard
deviations.
Contrary to past evidence (Imbs, 2004; Basile and Gi-
rardi, 2010), our findings so far suggest that increases in
the size of the manufacturing sector (Size) coincide with
an increase in specialization, suggesting that such an in-
crease might concentrate on a few industries in which
countries already specialize, resulting in rising inequal-
ity of the distribution of industry shares, i.e. more spe-
cialization. In line with Imbs and Wacziarg (2003), we
find a U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and
specialization. In the early stages of development, coun-
tries diversify and hold a more balanced structure of eco-
nomic activities in order to reduce the negative impact
of sector-specific shocks. At the later stages of develop-
ment, countries begin to specialize to fully exploit com-
parative advantages. The threshold level where coun-
tries re-specialize occurs when the level of GDP per capita
reaches 17,172 in constant 2000 US dollars, which is above
the sample average of 15,371 (roughly the level of Spain
in 2005). Our estimate, corresponding to 13,623 in con-
stant 1995 U.S. dollars is higher than that of Imbs (2004),
who reports thresholds ranging from 9,000 to 11,000 (in
constant 1995 US dollars). 42
To ensure the validity of our results, we perform a
range of diagnostic tests. The DHW statistic rejects the
42We take the average inflation rate of 31 countries in our sample from
1995-1999 (7.238, 5.366, 4.607, 2.894, 2.394 percent) to convert 17,172 con-
stant 2000 U.S. dollars into 13,623 constant 1995 U.S. dollars. The in-
flation data have been retrieved from the World Bank (2008) WDI. The
same calculation procedure is used in the following sections.
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Table 2: Empirical Results
Column (I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Specification equation (1) equation (2a) equation (2a′) equation (3a) equation (3b)
T -0.743*** -0.587*** -1.666*** -0.524***
(0.243) (0.193) (0.573) (0.157)
INT -0.705***
(0.134)
F 0.145*** -0.630*** -0.345*** 0.136*** 0.298***
(0.043) (0.208) (0.065) (0.034) (0.105)
TxF 0.154***
(0.047)
INTxF 0.122***
(0.022)
TxIIT 1.471*
(0.893)
FxFD -0.047**
(0.022)
IIT -5.951*
(3.588)
FD 0.257**
(0.123)
Size 0.555*** 0.145** 0.192*** 0.516*** 0.479***
(0.135) (0.0681) (0.071) (0.112) (0.103)
GDPpc -0.597** -0.527*** 0.523 -0.617 -0.381
(0.294) (0.159) (0.417) (0.420) (0.281)
GDPpc2 0.105** 0.064** -0.110 0.091 0.069
(0.051) (0.032) (0.079) (0.073) (0.049)
Endogeneity 0.005 0.097 0.045 0.039 0.025
AR(1) 0.050 0.045 0.159 0.076 0.093
AR(2) 0.316 0.111 0.253 0.747 0.899
Over-identification 0.920 0.059 0.333 0.445 0.317
Under-identification 0.073 0.001 0.131 0.032 0.058
Weak-identification 0.002 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Observations 671 704 350 517 646
All models are estimated in first difference using the two-step GMM estimator. Variables are expressed in logs, except IIT. The dependent variable is
S, the GINI specialization index. Other variables are defined as follows: T is trade openness, defined as total imports plus exports/GDP; INT is the
share of intra-Eurozone trade, defined as imports plus exports of a country with other Eurozone countries/country’s GDP; F is Financial openness,
defined as total financial assets plus liabilities/GDP; I IT is intra-industry trade intensity, defined as Grubel-Lloyd index; FD is financial development,
defined as liquid liabilities/GDP; Size is the share of total manufacturing value added in the economy; GDPpc is per capita real GDP (Constant 2000
U.S. dollars); GDPpc2 is per capita GDP squared; Endogeneity is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test; AR(1), AR(2) are Arellano-Bond serial correlation tests;
Over-identification is the Hansen J statistic; Under-identification is the Kleibergen-Paap rk test; Weak-identification is the Anderson-Rubin test. Robust
standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
null hypothesis that introducing instruments has no effect
on the estimated coefficients and confirms that trade inte-
gration is indeed endogenous in column (I).43 Therefore,
we use lagged levels of trade from t− 3, t− 4 and t− 5 as
instruments. The validity of lagged levels of trade inte-
gration as instruments is guaranteed by rejecting the ab-
sence of first-order serial correlation and not rejecting the
absence of second-order serial correlation. Moreover, the
43Financial integration is also likely to be an endogenous variable
based on the argument that more specialized countries might demand
more international insurance, therefore more likely to engage in finan-
cial integration. We apply the DHW endogeneity tests to check the
endogeneity of financial integration in both specifications and do not
find evidence that financial integration should be treated endogenously.
Moreover, similar test results appear in later specifications. In line with
past studies (Kalemli-Ozcan et al., 2003), we rely on the assumption that
the causality runs from financial integration to specialization and choose
not to instrument financial integration.
Hansen J test does not reject the over-identifying restric-
tions, confirming the validity of our instruments. Finally,
the Kleibergen-Paap rk test and the Anderson-Rubin test
confirm that specification (1) is properly identified and
does not suffer from under- and weak-identification prob-
lems.
To summarize, a key finding that emerges from our
analysis so far is that trade and financial integration are
both important in explaining variations in industrial spe-
cialization across countries.
4.2. Are trade and financial integration moderators of each
other’s relationship with specialization?
So far, we have neglected the possible connection be-
tween trade and financial integration in affecting special-
ization. We now proceed by examining the join effect of
trade and financial integration, as described in equation
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(2a). The results are shown in column (II) of Table 2. To
see the role of each type of integration, we have to also
consider the interaction effect, which enters with a pos-
itive sign, suggesting a complementary relationship be-
tween trade and financial integration. In other words, the
effect of trade (financial) integration is further enhanced
by the degree of (financial) trade integration. The one per-
cent significance level indicates a very strong association
between them.
In order to further assess the strength of each type of in-
tegration, we calculate the marginal effect of one type of
integration conditional on the other type, based on equa-
tions (2b) and (2c). Figures (2a) and (2b) illustrate these
conditional marginal effects and the corresponding confi-
dence 95 percent intervals (Brambor et al., 2006).44
Threshold effects are present in both figures. Figure
(2a) demonstrates that trade integration has a negative
relationship with specialization for lower levels of finan-
cial integration. Above a threshold level of financial in-
tegration, the relationship between trade and specializa-
tion turns positive. The threshold level corresponds to a
financial openness ratio above 45 percent of GDP, which
is slightly above the 10th percentile of the distribution of
financial openness, suggesting that the diversification ef-
fect of trade is only relevant when countries are not finan-
cially integrated.45
To shed more light on the economic nature of the re-
lationship between trade integration and specialization,
44The magnitude and significance of β1 and β2 in equation (2a) do
not bear direct interpretation regarding the impact of trade and finan-
cial integration on specialization as the interaction term, i.e.β3 needs to
be taken into account. Since we are mainly interested in how trade and
financial integration act as moderators of each other’s relationship with
specialization, we therefore compute the conditional marginal effect,
following Brambor et al. (2006). This approach sheds more light on the
threshold effects demonstrated in the following paragraphs. Ozer-Balli
and Sorensen (2010) propose a different treatment and interpretation of
linear regression models with interaction terms. They suggest that a
model with a demeaned instead of a conventional interaction term is
preferable as the former maintains the interpretation of the coefficients
to main terms similar to a model without the interaction term, while
keeping the coefficient on the interaction term (largely) unchanged. Fol-
lowing their approach, we re-estimate equation (2a), where in place of
Tit × Fit, we use a demeaned interaction term (Tit − T¯it)× (Fit − F¯it). We
find that in a fixed-effect specification, β1 and β2 in the case are very sim-
ilar to those obtained when estimating equation (1) and the coefficient
on the demeaned interaction term remains to a large extent constant.
However, in our first-difference specification, the demeaned interaction
term turns out insignificant.
45We check for the sub-sample stability of our results by splitting the
sample into high-tech and low-tech countries (See Appendix Table A.2).
We first compute the average share of medium and high-tech value
added in total manufacturing value added over time for each country,
countries whose share is above (below) the medium are classified as
high-tech (low-tech). The results are quite similar in both samples. The
notable differences lies in the level of threshold. The impact of trade
on specialization turns positive when the level of financial integration
reaches 100 percent and 29 percent of GDP for high-tech and low-tech
countries, respectively. The positive effect of financial integration on
specialization occurs when trade openness ratio is above 70 percent and
55 percent of GDP for high-tech and low-tech countries, respectively.
we can now evaluate equation (2b) at the mean, mini-
mum and maximum value of financial integration. The
marginal effect of trade integration on specialization at
the mean level of financial integration is 0.052. When fi-
nancial integration is at its lowest and we reach the bot-
tom left corner of Figure (2a), the marginal effect of trade
integration is -0.214. Finally, when financial integration
peaks and we reach the top right corner of Figure (2a), the
effect of trade integration is 0.231.46 Summing up, spe-
cialization decreases with trade when risk-sharing oppor-
tunities - captured by the low level of financial integration
- are limited. Once there are sufficient risk sharing op-
portunities, trade openness appears to induce specializa-
tion. One possible explanation is that countries diversify
their production to reduce output volatility that is asso-
ciated with trade openness. A number of cross-country
studies have documented that greater trade openness is
accompanied by higher aggregate volatilities of various
macroeconomic variables, e.g. volatility of GDP growth
(Kose et al., 2003; di Giovanni and Levchenko, 2009), in-
come and consumption growth (Bekaert et al., 2006). This
diversification effect of trade openness is likely to dimin-
ish as financial integration progresses.
The story is somewhat similar for the role of trade in-
tegration as a moderator to the financial integration and
industrial specialization relationship. In Figure (2b), we
show the effect of financial integration on specialization
conditional on trade integration. It is immediately clear
that the positive effect of financial integration on special-
ization through risk sharing can only be realized when
countries are sufficiently open to international trade. The
marginal effect of financial integration becomes positive
when the log of trade integration is slightly more than
four, corresponding to a trade openness ratio of approx-
imately 60 percent of GDP. At the mean level of trade
openness, the impact of financial integration on special-
ization is 0.1. When evaluated at the minimum level, the
impact takes the value of -0.278, while it becomes 0.528
when the level of trade openness reaches its maximum.47
This finding provides evidence that growing trade flows
(perhaps more inter-industry trade) create extra demands
for international insurances and enlarge the scope for fi-
nancial integration to have a bigger impact on special-
ization. Our results also relate to a strand of recent re-
search documenting that the level of trade openness mat-
ters for the effects of financial openness.48 For example,
more open economies are found to be less vulnerable to
financial crises (Calvo et al., 2004; Edwards, 2004a; Cav-
allo and Frankel, 2008). Among countries that have ex-
perienced these episodes, countries that are more open
46The calculation is as follows: −0.587 + 0.154 × 4.15 = 0.052,
−0.587+ 0.154× 2.42 = −0.214,−0.587+ 0.154× 5.31 = 0.231, all num-
bers are expressed as elasticities.
47The calculation is as follows: −0.63 + 0.154× 4.75 = 0.1, −0.63 +
0.154× 2.28 = −0.278, −0.63 + 0.154× 7.52 = 0.528.
48For a comprehensive survey, see Kose et al. (2009b).
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Figure 2: The role of trade integration and financial integration as moderators
(a) Financial integration as a moderator
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(b) Trade integration as a moderator
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to trade suffer smaller growth declines than those with a
lower degree of trade openness (Guidotti et al., 2004; Ed-
wards, 2004b). Such findings are consistent with the no-
tion that trade integration proceeds financial integration.
In other words, (developing) countries should liberalize
trade before they liberalize capital flows. Our results also
lend support to this notion as finance-induced specializa-
tion can only be realized when a threshold level of trade
openness is achieved.
When it comes to the control variables, the size of man-
ufacturing industries still exhibits a significant positive
coefficient, although its magnitude is smaller. The U-
shaped pattern between GDP per capita and specializa-
tion is (statistically) preserved. However, the threshold
level of GDP per capital, where countries begin to re-
specialize, is beyond the range of our sample, which only
supports the relevance of the diversification effect of eco-
nomic development.
Overall, these results suggest that financial integration
has a stronger relationship with specialization than trade
integration, as the marginal effect of financial integration
(at the sample mean) is almost twice as large as that of
trade integration (0.1 vs. 0.052) and statistically more sig-
nificant. We find that an increase in trade integration
leads to more specialization for most levels of financial
integration, although the effect is not always statistically
significant. In contrast, financial integration drives spe-
cialization only if countries are sufficiently open to trade
(above the median in our sample). Taken together, our
findings indicate that countries are likely to become more
specialized with further deepening of either trade and fi-
nancial integration. The simultaneous deepening along
both dimensions has a larger impact on specialization,
confirming the complementarity between trade and fi-
nancial integration.
Before moving on to our third question, we wish to
examine whether there is a regional dimension in the
integration-specialization nexus. We therefore focus on a
narrower group of countries that is highly integrated, the
Eurozone. We examine whether there is a regional dimen-
sion in the integration-specialization nexus. In particular,
we want to find out to what extent regional integration,
specifically trade integration, affects the production spe-
cialization in this group. For this purpose, we make use
of a narrower measure of trade openness, defined as the
share of intra-Eurozone trade scaled by GDP (INT). We
estimate equation (2a′) and results are shown in column
(III) in Table 2.
As the results show, both trade and financial integra-
tion have a negative sign and are statistically significant.
The interaction term enters with a positive sign and is
significant at 1 percent, once again confirming the com-
plementary relationship between (regional) trade integra-
tion and financial integration. We find that the impact of
regional trade integration, at the mean level of financial
integration, is -0.163. Interestingly, when we compute the
impact of global trade integration on specialization based
on point estimates in (II), we obtain 0.142.49 Our results
suggest that openness to trade within the Eurozone corre-
sponds to increased diversification, which manifests the
dominant role of intra-industry trade in contributing to
the similarity of production structures. In contrast, over-
all openness seems to result in more specialization. This
discrepancy could be attributed to the fact that the in-
creasing trade linkages between Eurozone countries with
emerging trade partners, including China, are likely to be
of the inter-industry type.
Turning to the effect of financial integration, we find
that, on average, the marginal effect of financial integra-
49The calculation is as follows: −0.705 + 0.122 × 4.812 = −0.163,
−0.58 + 0.15× 4.812 = 0.142
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tion on specialization is calculated to be 0.038. This effect
is marginally larger than that calculated using point esti-
mates in (II), which yields a number close to zero.50 This
finding confirms again that financial integration leads to
increased specialization only if countries are sufficiently
open. With respect to control variables, the size of the
manufacturing industry has a significant positive effect
on specialization. The U-shaped pattern between GDP
per capita and specialization disappears.
In terms of the diagnostic tests, the DHW statistic con-
firms that trade (intra-Eurozone trade), together with its
interaction with financial integration are indeed endoge-
nous variables in column (II) and (III). Therefore, we use
lagged levels of trade (intra-Eurozone trade) from t − 2,
t− 3 and lagged interaction term from t− 2, t− 3 as in-
struments. The validity of instruments is guaranteed by
rejecting the absence of first-order serial correlation and
not rejecting the absence of second-order serial correla-
tion, although the validity is weaker in (III), possibly ow-
ing to a relative small sample. The Hansen J test does
not reject the over-identifying restrictions at a reasonable
significance level. Finally, the Kleibergen-Paap rk test
and the Anderson-Rubin test show that specification (2a)
is properly identified and specification (2a′) may suffer
some under-identification problems.
Robustness analyses
To check the robustness of our results, we first con-
sider alternative measures of trade openness. All robust-
ness checks are based on equation (2a). Columns (i), (ii)
and (iii) in Table A.3 employ the imports share to GDP
(IMP), exports share to GDP (EXP) and manufacturing
trade openness (MANT), respectively. Results are in gen-
eral very similar to those reported in (II). Only in column
(iii), we find that the impact of manufacturing trade on
specialization becomes smaller in magnitude and in sig-
nificance.51 One possible explanation that could account
for this discrepancy is that trade in services (e.g. finan-
cial services) constitutes an important force to the conver-
gence of industrial structures across countries. We have
re-estimated (1) using the average of neighboring coun-
tries’ trade openness (AT) as the instrument for trade
openness. The results, displayed in column (iv), are very
similar, further confirming the validity of lagged trade
openness as instruments we use throughout the estima-
tion. Overall, our results do not seem to be driven by the
choice of a particular trade openness measure, nor by the
use of an alternative instrument.
We then use different measures of financial integration.
Columns (v) and (vi) in Table A.3 employ two narrower
50−0.345 + 0.122× 3.144 = 0.038.
51As a further check, we make use of a slightly different measure and
take total manufacturing trade scaled by GDP rather than total manu-
facturing output. Again, we find a somewhat smaller and insignificant
effect of trade integration on specialization compared with the specifi-
cation (II).
measures of financial openness, namely total liabilities
(i.e. accumulation of capital inflows) and assets plus lia-
bilities on FDI and portfolio investments divided by GDP
(LIB and FDIEQU). We find no significant changes to
our main findings. However, we obtain relatively weaker
results in column (vii) when using the de jure index (Fjure)
compiled by Chinn and Ito (2008). Trade integration bears
a positive sign - a finding consistent with recent studies
(Bonfiglioli, 2008; Baltagi et al., 2009) that highlight the
problems of using de jure measures to examine the effects
of financial integration.
Furthermore, we use two other measures of indus-
trial specialization, namely the Herfindahl-Hirschman in-
dex (HRI) and the coefficient of variation (VSI), calcu-
lated using value added data. Results are reported in
columns (viii) and (ix) in Table A.3. Again, results are
qualitatively similar. In addition, we consider special-
ization measures (GINIEMP, HRIEMP and VSIEMP)
computed from employment data and report results in
columns (x), (xi) and (xii). We note that trade integration
carries the same sign but now becomes insignificant. We
conclude that trade integration leads to less specialization
in terms of value added, but not in terms of employment.
This finding is in line with Wacziarg and Wallack (2004),
who also find that trade liberalization episodes do not
have any significant consequences on inter-sector labor
reallocation, even at higher levels of disaggregation.
Finally, we also check whether the estimation results
are driven by outliers. One or more very open coun-
tries could potentially drive the results. We drop Ireland,
where the financial openness is the highest in our sam-
ple, re-run the estimation and find quantitatively similar
results in column (xiii) in Table A.3.
In summary, two important findings emerge from our
analysis. First, we demonstrate that trade (financial) in-
tegration has pronounced effects on specialization when
the level of financial (trade) integration is high, in sup-
port of a complementary relationship. Second, while
global trade integration corresponds to more industrial
specialization, regional trade integration coincides with
increased diversification in the Eurozone. Findings are
robust to a wide range of alternative measurement strate-
gies.
4.3. Are intra-industry trade and financial development im-
portant mediators for the impact of trade and financial in-
tegration on specialization?
Having established that trade and financial integration
have a significant relationship with specialization, the last
step consists of investigating whether the strength of this
relationship is determined by intra-industry trade (I IT)
and financial development (FD), respectively.
Column (IV) in Table 2 presents the results based on
specification (3a), where I IT and its interaction term with
trade integration are included in the specification.52 Both
52Including both intra-industry trade and our traditional trade inte-
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terms are individually significant at 1 percent and 10 per-
cent (respectively) and jointly significant at 1 percent. Fig-
ure (3a) shows the marginal effect of trade integration
on specialization, conditional on the intra-industry trade
intensity. Consistent with column (I), trade integration
always leads to a negative impact on specialization, in-
dependent of the level of intra-industry trade. We find
that countries with high levels of intra-industry trade ex-
perience more specialization in response to further inte-
gration than countries with low levels of intra-industry
trade. Contrary to our expectation, intra-industry trade
seems to dilute the diversification effect of trade rather
than promoting it. One possible explanation is that fur-
ther exposure to trade encourages inter-industry trade
proportionally more than intra-industry trade for coun-
tries that are already heavily engaged in intra-industry
trade, consequently resulting in less diversification. Fi-
nancial integration enters with a positive and statistically
significant coefficient at 1 percent. The magnitude is com-
parable to that found in column (I), confirming the impor-
tant role of financial integration in driving specialization.
To gauge the role of financial development in medi-
ating the effect of financial integration on specialization,
column (V) in Table 2 shows the results based on specifi-
cation (3b), where financial development and its interac-
tion term with financial integration are added in the spec-
ification. We first note that trade integration still exhibits
a significant, negative relationship with specialization. Fi-
nancial integration remains a significant, driving force in
promoting specialization.
Figure (3b) shows that the marginal effect of financial
integration on specialization is negatively associated with
the degree of financial development, implying that the ef-
fect of financial integration in promoting specialization is
larger in countries with less developed financial systems
and smaller in those with well developed financial sys-
tem.
The apparent substitution between financial integra-
tion and financial development in Figure (3b) suggests
that both represent alternative channels for countries to
share idiosyncratic production risks and thereby smooth
consumption and income, which, in turn, induces more
specialization. On the one hand, a country with a well-
developed financial system can more easily diversify
sector-specific risks, and consequently has greater incen-
gration measure, as well as an interaction term, may raise concerns re-
garding multicollinearity. However, in light of our analysis of the condi-
tional marginal effects in Figures (3a) and (3b), two aspects of columns
(IV) and (V) are worth mentioning (Brambor et al., 2006). First, given the
inclusion of interaction terms, we never intend to measure the average
effect of a variable in the same way as we would in an additive model,
as in column (I). As a result, a change in coefficients as a result of includ-
ing the interaction terms, should not be interpreted as a sign of multi-
collinearity. Second, the main 'problem' with multicollinearity would
be large standard errors, something that would be accurately captured
by Figures (3a) and (3b) and would thereby not lead us to overstate the
significance of our results.
tives to specialize. In this case, there is less scope for
further risk-sharing through financial integration, which
in turn has less of an effect on specialization. The abil-
ity of reallocating and diversifying risk is considered as
one of the major functions of domestic financial systems
in shaping production structure and fostering economic
development. This argument has been strongly empha-
sized by a vast body of finance-growth literature (King
and Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997; Beck et al., 2000). On
the other hand, countries with underdeveloped financial
systems may lack appropriate instruments to pool risk.
They can benefit more from the openness of financial mar-
kets, which brings domestic residents a wider range of ex-
ante and ex-post insurance instruments to enhance port-
folio diversification and lower aggregate production risk.
Consequently, for these countries financial openness sur-
passes financial development to become the main driver
in facilitating risk sharing, consequently promoting spe-
cialized production structures. Our results provide some
evidence to support this view.
An alternative interpretation relies critically on the fi-
nancial dependence of sectors. Seminal work by Rajan
and Zingales (1998) develops a methodology to rank in-
dustries according to their external dependence on fi-
nancing. They find that industries that are highly de-
pendent on external financing grow faster in countries
with relatively developed financial systems. Subsequent
studies confirm that financial development, as a source
of comparative advantage can directly influence the de-
gree of specialization precisely by promoting financially
dependent sectors (Beck, 2002, 2003; Svaleryd and Vla-
chos, 2005; Hur et al., 2006). In the same vein, other stud-
ies find industries that are heavily dependent on finance
grow faster in countries with liberalized financial markets
(Vanassche, 2004).53 Taken together, the substitution hy-
pothesis holds if financial development and financial in-
tegration are alternative channels through which indus-
tries/firms are able to raise funds to alleviate their financ-
ing constrains, allowing them to grow faster.54 However,
given the data at our disposal, we can not perform a di-
rect test to discriminate between these two competing in-
terpretations.55
53Vlachos and Waldenström (2005) do not find support to this view.
Eichengreen et al. (2009) provide a comprehensive survey and find rea-
sonably strong evidence that financial openness has positive effects
on the growth of industries that are dependent on external finance,
although these growth-enhancing effects evaporate during financial
crises.
54To shed more light on this argument, we refine our specializa-
tion measure by computing the share of manufacturing value added in
high financial dependent sector(SHIGH) and low financial dependent
sector(SLOW) as independent variables (See Appendix Table A.2) and
re-estimate equation (3b). Columns (xiv) and (xv) in Table (A.3) show
that increases in financial integration and financial development lead
to increases in the importance of financial dependent sectors. That is,
countries with higher levels of financial integration and development
experience a shift in production towards industries with high depen-
dence on external finance.
55To further gauge the potential linkages between moderation and
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Figure 3: The role of intra-industry trade intensity and financial development as mediators
(a) Intra-industry trade intensity as a mediator
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(b) Financial development as a mediator
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In terms of control variables, the size of the manufac-
turing industry continues to have a significant and posi-
tive effect on specialization in both specifications (3a) and
(3b). However, GDP per capita and its squared term carry
the correct sign, both are no longer significant, possibly
due to the inclusion of the intra-industry trade measure
or the financial development measure.56 The threshold
level of GDP per capita that countries need to reach be-
fore moving to the specialization stage is 30,121 US dol-
lars (23,896 constant 1995 US dollars), which is above the
95th percentile of the whole distribution in specification
(3a) and 15,592 US dollars (12,670 constant 1995 US dol-
lars), which is approximately the sample mean level of
GDP per capita in specification (3b).
Overall, the diagnostic tests are satisfactory in both
specifications. The DHW statistic confirms that trade in-
tegration is an endogenous variable in column (IV), and
trade integration and it interaction with I IT are endoge-
nous variables in column (V). In column (V), we instru-
ment them using the lagged trade integration from t− 3,
t − 4 and the lagged interaction term from t − 3, t − 4,
whereas in column (IV) we instrument trade integration
with lagged trade from t− 3, t− 4 and t− 5. The absence
mediation effects, we perform an additional exercise by re-estimating
equation (2a) in two ways, following Brambor et al. (2006). First, we
add Tit × Fit × I ITit and all combinations between Tit, Fit and I ITit. In a
similar vein, we also add Tit × Fit × FDit and all combinations between
Tit, Fit and FDit instead. Our aim is to examine whether the moderation
effect between trade and financial integration on specialization depends
on the levels of mediators intra-industry trade and financial develop-
ment. More specifically, we calculate the marginal effect of Tit × Fit on
Sit, conditional on I ITit and FDit. As shown in Appendix Figure (A.1),
the conditional marginal effects do not seem to vary with the level of
I ITit and FDit, suggesting that the moderation and mediation effects
are likely to be independent from each other. Therefore, we prefer to
discuss them in separate sections.
56They are also not jointly significant. The p-value of a standard F test
is 0.105 and 0.175 in (3a) and (3b), respectively.
of first-order serial correlation is rejected and the absence
of second-order correlation is not rejected at the reason-
able level of significance. The Hansen J test does not reject
over-identifying restrictions in both specifications. The
Kleibergen-Paap rk test and the Anderson-Rubin test re-
ject the null-hypothesis of under-identification and weak-
identification. All these tests indicate both specifications
are well-specified.
Robustness analysis
To ensure the robustness of our results, we employ two
other measures of financial development: the amount of
credit provided to private agents scaled by GDP, and the
bank concentration index. Results are shown in columns
(xvi) and (xvii), respectively, of Table A.3 in the Ap-
pendix. It appears that the size of the banking sector does
not have a significant direct impact on specialization, nor
an indirect impact via financial integration. When look-
ing at the structure of the banking sector, we find some
evidence that the relationship between financial integra-
tion and specialization is larger in countries with a less
concentrated banking sector, although statistically not
significant. This may imply a potentially important me-
diating mechanism through which financial integration
affects specialization, namely by improving efficiency in
the banking sector via increasing competition and facili-
tating risk sharing in a more efficient way. This finding is
in line with Leibrecht and Scharler (2009) who demon-
strate that the development of the banking sector con-
tributes little to the international diversification of con-
sumption risk among the OECD countries. Moreover,
they postulate that the extent of risk sharing achieved is
not dependent on the overall size of the financial sector
per se, but rather on its structure, i.e. how the financial
system is organized. Our tentative evidence seems to be
pointing in this direction. Future research on structural
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aspects of the financial system in facilitating the effect of
financial integration on specialization is warranted.
Summing up, we find that (i) trade integration has
a stronger relationship with industrial specialization in
countries with a high degree of intra-industry trade; (ii)
financial integration has a stronger relationship with spe-
cialization in countries with relatively less developed fi-
nancial systems, a finding in line with the substitution hy-
pothesis; however, the substitution effect does not appear
to be very strong; (iii) although we find a U-shaped pat-
tern between GDP per capita and specialization in most of
the specifications, the threshold point of GDP per capita,
where countries re-specialize, varies significantly across
specifications, casting some doubts on the implications of
such a finding.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigates the economic integration - in-
dustrial specialization nexus and empirically establishes
the direct linkages between trade, financial integration
and industrial specialization for a panel of 31 countries
over the period 1970-2005.
We contribute to the existing literature by answering
three questions. First, we document the relationship be-
tween economic integration and specialization via two
separate channels, trade and financial openness. We find
a statistically significant negative relationship between
trade integration and specialization, suggesting that fur-
ther openness to foreign trade induces a more diversified
industrial structure, and a statistically significant posi-
tive effect of financial integration on specialization, in line
with the risk-sharing rationale put forward by Kalemli-
Ozcan et al. (2003), and subsequently confirmed by Basile
and Girardi (2010) and Imbs (2004). In terms of magni-
tude, the negative relationship of trade openness with
specialization dominates the positive relationship of fi-
nancial openness.
Second, we show that financial integration acts as a
moderator to the relationship between trade integration
and specialization, and vice versa. We demonstrate that
the role of trade (financial) integration is further en-
hanced by the degree of financial (trade) integration. Our
finding indicates that trade and financial integration do
not operate through independent channels. In fact, they
complement each other in shaping industrial specializa-
tion across countries. Furthermore, trade integration co-
incides with increased specialization for most levels of
financial integration, whereas financial integration co-
exists with high degrees of specialization only if countries
are sufficiently open to trade. These findings extend Imbs
(2004) by offering additional insights in understanding
trade and financial integration as joint determinants of
specialization across countries. Moreover, for a number
of highly integrated Eurozone countries, we find that re-
gional trade openness coincides with industrial diversifi-
cation, while global trade openness coincides with higher
degrees of specialization.
Lastly, we assess the impact of two important media-
tors to the relationship between economic integration and
industrial specialization. First, we study to what degree
intra-industry trade intensity acts as a mediator to the re-
lationship between trade integration and specialization.
Our results reveal that trade integration has a stronger re-
lationship with specialization in countries with high lev-
els of intra-industry trade. Next, we study how financial
development mediates the relationship between financial
integration and specialization. Our findings suggest that
financial integration has a stronger relationship with spe-
cialization in countries with less developed financial sys-
tems, although this substitution effect does not appear to
be very strong. Overall, our results are robust to a wide
range of alternative measures and estimation strategies.
A main implication of our results is the importance
of simultaneously deepening trade and financial integra-
tion. Countries that exploit integration along both lines
can be expected to benefit the most from the benefits of
integration (economies of scale and enhanced efficiency),
while insuring themselves against idiosyncratic shocks.
However, both effects depend crucially on the degree
to which trade is intra-industry and the level of devel-
opment of the domestic financial system. On the one
hand, countries with little intra-industry trade and a high
level of financial development may not reap great bene-
fits from specialization, but will also be less exposed to
shocks. On the other hand, countries with large inter-
industry trade and a relatively low level of financial de-
velopment stand to gain the most from increased trade
ánd financial integration, as the former will allow them
to reap the fruits of comparative advantage, whereas the
latter may improve risk-sharing.
Nevertheless, our analysis underlines the fact that in
the presence of asymmetric shocks, there is still a need
for better risk-sharing mechanisms, in particular in the
presence of common policy objectives, such as is the case,
for example, in the Eurozone.
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Appendix
Table A.1: Country, Time and Specialization
Eurozone Countries Specialization Non-Eurozone Countries Specialization
Austria (1970-2005) 0.356 Australia (1970-2005) 0.420
Belgium (1970-2005) 0.432 Canada (1979-2003) 0.393
Finland (1970-2005) 0.461 Czech Republic (1995-2005) 0.385
France (1970-2005) 0.52 Cyprus (1995-2005) 0.574
Germany (1970-2005) 0.408 Denmark (1970-2005) 0.500
Greece (1970-2005) 0.499 Estonia (1995-2005) 0.487
Italy (1970-2005) 0.371 Hungary (1995-2005) 0.409
Ireland (1970-2005) 0.591 Japan (1973-2005) 0.388
Luxembourg (1970-2005) 0.485 Korea (1970-2005) 0.455
Netherlands (1970-2005) 0.471 Latvia (1995-2005) 0.613
Portugal (1970-2005) 0.434 Lithuania (1995-2005) 0.527
Spain (1970-2005) 0.383 Malta (1995-2005) 0.522
Norway (1979-2003) 0.454
Poland (1995-2005) 0.405
Slovakia (1995-2005) 0.373
Slovenia (1995-2005) 0.356
Sweden (1970-2005) 0.467
United Kingdom (1970-2005) 0.362
United States (1970-2005) 0.398
The time span for each country is in parentheses. Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain adopted the Euro on January 1, 1999. Greece was admitted on January 1, 2001. Although Cyprus, Malta
entered the Euro-system on January 1, 2008 and Slovakia on January 1, 2009, our data stop at 2005. Therefore we classify these
three countries as Non-Eurozone countries in our sample. Specialization is the average Gini coefficient (value added) over time.
Table A.2: Industries and NACE Codes
Industry NACE Code Technology Financial Dependence
Food, beverages and tobacco products 15-16 Low/Medium-low Low
Textiles, wearing apparel 17-18 Low/Medium-low High
Leather products and footwear 19 Low/Medium-low Low
Wood products and cork 20 Low/Medium-low High
Pulp, paper products 21 Low/Medium-low High
Publishing and printing 22 Low/Medium-low Low
Coke, refined petroleum and nuclear fuel 23 Low/Medium-low High
Pharmaceuticals 24 High/Medium-high High
Rubber and plastics products 25 Low/Medium-low High
Other non-metallic mineral products 26 Low/Medium-low Low
Basic metals 27 Low/Medium-low High
Fabricated metal products 28 Low/Medium-low Low
Machinery, NEC 29 High/Medium-high High
Office machinery 30 High/Medium-high High
Other electrical machinery 31 High/Medium-high Low
Electronic valves and tubes 32 Low/Medium-low High
Scientific instruments 33 High/Medium-high Low
Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 34 High/Medium-high High
Building repairing aircraft and spacecraft 35 High/Medium-high High
Manufacturing nec, recycling 36-37 Low/Medium-low Low
The classification of high-tech vs.low-tech industries is based on OECD (2005). The classification of financial dependent industries is based on
Cetorelli and Strahan (2006, p. 447). They define a firm’s financial dependence as the proportion of capital expenditures not financed with cash flow
from operation, following Rajan and Zingales (1998). Then they take the level of the median firm as external financial dependence of the industry.
We classify, therefore, industries as high vs. low financial dependence based on the median across all industries.
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Figure A.1: Moderators and Mediators
(a) Intra-industry trade as a mediator
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